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Numerous explanations for the productivity slowdown of 
the United States have been expounded by economists, business 
leaders, and politicians since it became painfully apparent in 
the early 1970s. With the imposition of a form of environmental 
regulation upon American industry in general not unlike that 
imposed by the Defense Department upon its contractors, the most 
connnonly given cause is government regulation. How else to 
explain the productivity slowdown? 
Regulation, as it is connnonly practiced, can have a 
highly nonlinear effect on the generation of productivity gains. 
All advances in technology, whether or not in the form of pro-
ductivity gains, come about because of cleverness and luck in 
changing initial conditions; that is, they occur in the form of 
a dynamic process. But the more constraints that are imposed upon 
dynamic process -- whether by government regulation or a research 
and development manager intent upon maximizing the short-run bene-
fits of an R & D project -- the more difficult it will be to bring 
* 
I want to thank David Feinstein for undertaking the statistical 
analysis described in Parts III and IV. 
about successful advances. This is not to say there �s an�thing 
wrong with the goal of environmental regulation. The prbb�em, 
rather, is the failure to appreciate that the best f:lrm lf lregul 
lation is competition to stimulate the development o� mole ef fij 
technology from an environmental point of view. 
Nevertheless, it is my conviction that whi
J
e gov,rnmen 
r•gula<ion o•r<ainly oxp•di<•d <he lo•• of dyn�i� � <te U. sl
economy, it did not cause it. The most important colditlorl for 
the maintenance of a dynamic industry is the more or less ontirt 
uous entry into it of new firms. But greatly rising lent� cost] 
sooner or later discourage the establishment of new �irmb. The� 
fore, more and more industries become forests withoutj an� ew I 
.J I , trees, and a loss of dynamism in the entire economy �an pe pred� 
I. FAST AND SLOW HISTORY 
Very often the best way to come to grips w 
complicated problem is to consider a somewhat simple 
will hopefully provide insights with respect to the 
nt 
ed. 
The specific problem which I discussed in my book �D-""""i;;;.;.:='-':.....;:��-+1� 
is this: 
almost invariably succeeded by slow history? 
rate of progress in improving the performance 
be roughly measured. Improvements in the performance ofl tHe 
technology might take the form of either reductions �n cbstts or 
improv�en<• of quali<y (e.g.,� in <he oa•e of eemJo�rwl<or•l 
but whether they take one or the other form, let us Jegardlsuch 
improvements as increases in productivity. It would be nice, of 
3 
course, if we could devise a single index which took both cost and 
quality improvements into account; in other words, if we had 
price indices that were related not to the cost of particular 
commodities, but rather to particular kinds of operations. How-
ever, inasmuch as we do not have such indices, let us assume that 
productivity gains can be measured in either terms of reductions 
in costs or improvements in quality, depending on which provides 
a better approximation of reality. 
Now, if improvements in productivity are plotted against 
time, typically the curve will take the form of an S-shaped curve 
in which a period of very rapid progress (fast history) is fol-
lowed by a period of slower progress (slow history): see Figure 1. 
Consequently, the question of concern to me is why the rate of 
progress slows down? According to conventional wisdom, the slow-
down occurs because all the really good ideas for nonincremental 
advances have been exploited. Therefore, we are told, if progress 
is to continue it must become very slow and expensive. 
Now, it certainly can be agreed that if a technology 
were defined in a highly specific manner, for example, if the 
definition of railroad technology only encompassed the possibility 
of steam engines, a slowdown in the performance of that technology 
would sooner or later be inevitable. However, a technology need 
not be defined so narrowly. Indeed, nearly all significant advances 
involve broadening the definition of the technology in question. 
The question, therefore, is why do well-established firms in an 
� 
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industry eventually define their technology very narrowly? 
That they do is indicated by the fact that when a techno-
logy is finally defined more broadly, seldom is it done by a major 
firm in that industry. Impressive advances are often made by a 
new firm in the industry (for example, Bessemer steel), by a firm 
in another industry (for example, deisel locomotives), or they 
may be brought about by a university laboratory (for example, 
computerized machine tools). But once a technology has slowed 
down, seldom, if ever, do insiders play a major role in speeding
up its history. And, if conventional wisdom is right -- if it 
is true that ideas for impressive and relatively inexpensive ad-
vances are in very short supply, then why do the ideas have to 
come from outsiders rather than insiders? 
Still another reason for being skeptical of conventional
wisdom is the history of foreign trade. Very often, when the 
United States loses its export advantage in a particular field,
it is not because the ideas were unknown to American firms, but
that foreign firms were much faster on their feet in exploiting 
them. For example, the "new revolutionary" low fuel-consuming 
American automobiles are surely not based on ideas completely un-
known to American automotive engineers ten or fifteen years ago. 
Nor are the "new revolutionary" Japanese semiconductors based upon
ideas completely unknown to people in the American semiconductor 
industry; what distinguishes the Japanese firms is that they seem
to be better listeners. 
If progress in improving a technology does not slow
down because of a shortage of ideas, then why does itlslo own?
As will be suggested in the next section, slowdowns do nolt <!Jccur 
because of a shortage of ideas, they occur because of 
.
la lottage 
of hidd•�foo' feedbaok. 
I I II. THE ROLE OF FEEDBACK IN DETERMINING THE RATE OF 
l
ECHNOtOGIC 
CHANGE J I The ability of an industry to make fast histor
l 
i$ de-
penden' upon bo'h 'he in'e�al oha,ao,eri•<ioa of fi� andlthei� 
external challenges. The most important internal chairacjer sticll 
is entrepreneurship -- the essence of which is the abllijy o as 
••arohing q�•<ion•. While en<repreneur• are of<� d1•o,ib>d aa 
risk-takers, this is not the key difference between an entrtpre-
1 I neur and a manager. The key difference is that whereas tihelform 
has a relative advantage in asking sharp questions abllut lte hno­
logical and market possibilities, the manager's relat ve ladf anta 
consists in answering well-defined questions. The molt �mp rtanl 
external factors consist of hidden-hand and hidden-folt Jee bacJl
Hidden-hand feedbaok i• m•�•r•d by ohang•• in profi<l � ''' 
larger and more unpredictable the changes, the greater the.�egre 
of feedback. Hidden-foot feedback is measured by charlg,, i 
market shares -- the larger and more unpredictable th chan�es, 
the greater the degree of feedback. A high degree oflhiJdeh-foo 
feedback indicates that entrepreneurs are taking sign fidan 
risks. To be sure, it is conceivable that all firms in Jn 
industry can be pressing for large advances, that alllwi11 Oe 
equally successful, and their market shares will rema n more or
less constant. But statistically speaking, such a result has a 
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probability of something like one-tenth of one percent. When firms 
take large risks, almost invariably there is a wide variance in 
the degree of success of R & D projects; and, typically, large 
changes in market shares hinge on differential degrees of success. 
In other words, that which is a technological risk for one firm 
is a competitive risk for another. And the greater the degree 
of technological risk-taking, the more effective the hidden foot 
and the more effective the hidden foot, the more likely that 
entrepreneurs will ask searching questions. 
The question-asking function is crucially important 
because, while productivity gains cannot be brought about without 
changing initial conditions, initial conditions cannot be changed 
without asking searching questions. To be sure, asking tough and 
searching questions does not necessarily insure that good answers 
will be forthcoming. The hints required to provide such answers 
may come from science, from such an unlikely source as seeing in 
a German toy a way to obtain a missile guidance system with non-
linear responses, or from an industry quite unlike the industry 
in question. For example, a Ford Motor Company employee conceived 
the idea for introducing automatic production lines by observing 
that process employed in meat packing plants -- and by asking him-
self why, if such a process could be used for disassembling car-
casses, could it not be used for assembling automobiles? 
This is not to say, of course, that the entrepreneur 
will always be lucky in discovering the appropriate hints. Never-
r th 
tionll 
theless, the probability of being lucky is infinitely1gre1at 
it would be if the entrepreneur did not raise searchi g Jue 
To rephrase Pasteur's famous remark, "Chance favors a quJst}onin 
Finally, it may ba noCad <hat <hia quaaci=rli .. 
function has very important side benefits. People within the 
organization who are highly responsive to searching fll ' 1•tt•< 
answers are typically well-rewarded -- financially an in terms 
mind." 
 of recognition. In other words, the very process of jea,ching 
for better answers generates a good deal of internal feedback. 
Indeed, it is only by the creation of such an internal fJedback 
 system that a firm is able to respond to a high degre� 01 f
.
�ed-
back in its external environment. I 
To sum up the argument thus far: The roles l of chance 
and necessity are not independent. Necessity in the form of the 
hiddan foot g<•atly atimulataa tho qu•ation <aiaing alti1it 
and this, in turn, greatly increases the probability lha4 o�e or
another firm in the industry will be favored by luck. [ 
An industry may be blessed by a goodly amoutt or 
small amount of hidden-foot feedback. What determines wJether 
there will be an adequate supply or a shortage of feelbaJk ls th
ease of new firms entering the industry in question. In lal�ost 
any rapidly evolving technology newly established firms invtriabl 
account for more than their share of significant disclveJie -- ��b 
by doing so they help prevent the well-established fi�s lfrbm 
becoming well-organized bureaucracies. Unfortunately � hqwever, 
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as the evolution of a new technology continues, scale economies 
of one kind or another become increasingly important -- so much so 
that the cost of entry increases by one or two orders of magnitude.
It is my conviction that this is why fast history in improving a 
technology is typically followed by slow history. In short, slow 
history sets in not because of a shortage of ideas, but, rather, 
because of a shortage of feedback. 
This is not to say, however, that without the presence 
of a hidden foot the hidden hand cannot bring about rapid improve-
ments in productivity in a particular industry. Suppose that the 
inputs for such progress are generated in a completely different 
industry and then sold to the industry in question in a manner 
that it has to take no significant risks. The classic example is
the airlines which were able to achieve sensational advances in 
productivity during the 1950s and the 1960s primarily on the 
basis of buying airliners with lower and lower operating costs. 
However, without a good deal of rivalry in the industry engaged 
in buying progress, it is highly unlikely that sustained progress
will indefinitely occur in the supplying industry. Thus, deregu-
lation of the airlines was probably one of the most constructive 
steps that could have been taken to maintain our technological 
leadership in the field of commercial aircraft. For example, as 
a result of competition in the cotton textile industry the United
States was once an important exporter of textile manufacturing 
machinery. But the advances in productivity in the cotton textile
industry over the past ten or fifteen years occurred mainly as a 
consequence of cotton textile machinery imported fro4 Euro 
Nevertheless, in one important sense, at lJastl even ti 
lm dyo=ic indu"ri"' aro no< comple<ely lacking i1 �la
.
dive 
feedback. During period• of rece••ion fi�• in <he']  <rie• 
must face the prospect of large and highly unpredict1ble d clin]
in profits. So to protect themselves from this kind of un redij
tability firms must begin asking the questions they topbe ask�· 
once prosperous business conditions prevailed. Howev.
J
er, I i muJ
be emphasized that the fault for this cannot entirel 1 belblamed 
on managers working hard one year and slacking off t 
slow history organizations, officials tend to be hig 
to accept responsibility, and for this reason they i
selves highly inflexible operating procedures and an
amount of red tape. Moreover, the speed with which 
cratic response can happen, after a slow history org 
dealt with a new series of challenges, is positively 
This is not to suggest, of course, that th 
cycle can be explained in terms of lapses from burea
downturns and the reemergence of bureaucracy during 
• Irt 
illJ 
IIn the· ::
f 
:::l�·l::aul niz t on ha
I amazil)g. 
c:+: 
pturn 
ess 
durirt 
While no doubt this is a contributing factor, many otjher l f
l
ctors 
too are at work. All that I suggest is that inasmucH asl f edbaj
is more continuous in the high productivity industri1s, we
expect to observe that progress in improving product"vit� 
lower productivity industries is to a greater degree assbc
with the business cycle. 
can 
n the 
ated 
1, 
III. DIMENSIONS OF THE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN 
11 
There are two ways of judging the extent of the producti-
vity slowdown. One is by comparing U. S. performance with that of 
the other major industrialized nations. And, as Figure II shows, 
in terms of this measure, U. S. relative performance has been 
worsening for some years -- to the extent that now its productivity 
performance is hardly better than that of Britain's. In turn, 
this comparison helps to show why the U. S. balance of trade 
began to deteriorate even before large increases in the dollar 
volume of oil imports occurred. When a country's productivity 
performance is improving relative to the performance of other 
countries, it will enjoy a favorable balance of trade. On the 
other hand, when a nation's longer-term productivity performance 
is poorer than that of others, this implies that costs in that 
country are not being reduced at the same rate. Consequently, 
its products,will be less competitive in international trade. 
For example, it is no accident that almost since the beginning 
of this century Britain has faced a chronic balance of payments 
problem. 
The other way of judging productivity performance is by 
examining the longer-run productivity trend in the United States. 
For this purpose, the best available measure takes both capital 
and labor inputs into account in order to construct a measure of
"total factor productivity gains." However, inasmuch as such 
estimates are not available for recent years, the estimates shown 
for the period 1948-1977 in Figure III take into account only 
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labor inputs. However, because savings in capital inputs tend to 
be highly associated with savings in labor inputs, estimates of 
labor productivity tend to be in very close agreement with esti-
mates of total factor productivity. 
As Figure III shows, because of the close relationship 
of productivity performance to the business cycles, it is by no 
means easy to establish a trend line for judging long-term changes 
in productivity performance. While it is generally agreed there 
has been a decline, Edward Dennison, a top expert in the field of 
productivity measurement, does not believe that the decline began 
until the early 1970s. However, I believe that the decline began 
in the middle 1960s, when, despite increasing defense expenditures 
and the stimulus provided to growth in output in manufacturing, 
American productivity performance began to worsen -- anticipating 
a slowup in the growth of output in the manufacturing sector of the 
economy. It fact, had it not been for large public expenditures, 
the United States might have had a serious economic downturn in the 
late 1960s. 
It is also impressive that, while the rate of productivity
increase declined more during the 1973-1974 recession than in pre-
vious post-World War II recessions, the recovery was very rapid. And 
it should be noted that this cannot be explained entirely by the 
conventional static argument: an inevitable slowing in the rate of
productivity gains when capacity utilization is very high, coupled 
with a reluctance to lay off workers when output declines. First, 
a definite retardation in the rate of productivity increase 
occurred in 1971, when the degree of capacity utilizatio 
conspicuously high. Secondly, and more important, whllelth 
argument can explain why, as measured in absolute te�s, 
was nl 
st
il pr 
should decline during a recession, the fact of the matter i! 
in absolute terms productivity is typically higher af 
For example, during the 1971 recession the rate of pr 
increase did not decline below zero. 
duct1 
thjl iitur 
In order to obtain a deeper understanding of tae 
tivity decline and its inflationary implications, I hrvelr 
been studying the performance of some 500 manuf acturirg n
baaed upon data aupplied by the Bur�u of Labor Stati[tila 
period 1958 to 1976. On the basis of their average rµte l o 
productivity gains during the first part of the periob 195 
1967, these industries were divided into high, mediu�, ald llow 
performance groups. The high performance group consi lsteh df 
induatriea �re than one at'""ard deviation above th avf r•ge; 
and it accounted for about 8 percent of total manufa turin� em-
than one standard deviation below the average, and a coult d foj 
6 percent of manufacturing employment. 
•ty
The following three figures (IV, V, VI) pr ide 
on the performance of the high, medium, and low perf rmalc
Note that the figurea alao c�tain linea relating to �if 
and prices; for the moment, however, ignore these. hei  
will become clear when we turn to the question of inflatio 
.nforrlill.ldion 
gro� 
If the performance of the high group is comnarld, 
o
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that of the medium and low groups, two important differences can 
be seen. In the first place, until the 1973-1974 downturn, 
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fortunes of the high performance group were not nearly so closely 
linked to the business cycle. In fact, until that downturn the 
rate of increase in output of this group was not significantly 
below zero. In other words, recessions in these industries occurred 
mainly in the rate of growth. By contrast, the 1959 and the 1968-
1972 downturns were quite serious for both the medium and low 
performance groups. The principal reason for this difference in 
behavior is that suggested in the previous section, namely, that 
the high performance group did not have to depend so much on 
challenges for their recessions. Indeed, in these industries a 
recession caused by a rival business firm could have far more 
serious consequences than a general economic downturn. Moreover, 
the fact that those in the high performance group were more ac-
customed to dealing with negative feedback may help to explain 
why the productivity recovery of this group was much greater than 
that of the low and medium performance industries. 
On the other hand, the fact that those in the high 
performance group needed such a jolt in order to bring about sub-
stantial improvements in their performance also suggests a group 
of industries in which there is a lessening of feedback, except 
during times of recession. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to prove it, but it is 
my guess that these high performance industries are beginning to 
suffer from essentially the same problem as the less stable 
industries, namely, a substantial slowdown in entry ]'f riewlfi 
There is a wide variety of evidence to indicate that thJ inter 
symptoms of a collapse in dynamic behavior are highl cdnsbnant 
with the hypothesis of a shortage of feedback in the fot ff tr(, 
hidden '°°'· Foe =ample, in <he 1979 BaCelle Repoc , r babl� 
Levels of R & D Expenditures in 1979, n the following ba1ri rs tll
innovation are listed: I 
1. A growing insistence on certainty of profits in the 
short term. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The "not invented heren syndrome. 
Growth of a professional management class wtictl h[s no
entrepreneurial stake in the business. 
Formalization of short-term executive tours of lse vicj 
e.g., up, down, sideways, or out every thre 
discouraging longer-term, innovative projec 
Use of executive incentives programs which 
accounting concepts of achievement. 
s�1 
f�ve 
:mpliasli.ze 
6. Failure to organize for innovation -- inste�d, fbUlsine 
7. 
is increasingly organized for steady profittbilit[ and
not for risk-taking. I I Tendency to try to buy corporate growth thr ugli a quil
sitions rather than through innovation and/ r Jxp nsio 
IV. A LESS AND LESS FLEXIBLE PRICE SYSTEM 
Turning next to the question of inflation,! itlc be 
I that the most impressive fact about the last three f·gures is ti 
very rapid rise in the rate of price inflation betwe n 197 and 
1974; and its failure to abate while the manufacturi g lna str� 
were heading. into the steepest downturn since 1956. To be surJ 
something like one-third of the total increase in prJice9 (' .e . .I 
0 
s --
n 
one-third of the area beneath the curve) can be attributed to 
increases in the price of oil. However, even after giving OPEC 
its fair share of the blame, the conclusion is much the same; 
that is, the sensitivity of prices to economic downturns is very 
low -- so low that we can experience a serious recession and 
severe inflation simultaneously. 
However, the insensitivity of prices to economic down-
turns is not an entirely new element in the American economy. In 
fact, each downturn in which manufacturing output has fallen 5 
21 
percent or more has evoked a smaller price response. Thus, during 
the 1956-1958 downturn, prices were far less sensitive to declines 
in output than they were during the milder recessions of the mid-
1920s. Then, during the 1968 to 1972 recession, prices and output 
began to move in opposite directions for the first time; that is, 
while output was going down the rate of inflation jumped to 5 per-
cent. Finally, during the most recent downturn prices not only 
jumped after the downturn but they kept on jumping. 
If prices do not move with general business conditions, 
then with what do they move? As Figures IV, V, and VI show, there 
is a high degree of correspondence between movements in unit 
labor costs and prices. Unit labor costs are defined as the 
average labor cost of producing one unit of output, and are obtained 
by dividing output in a given time period by the total wage bill. 
In turn, unit labor costs account for about 75 percent of total 
costs in manufacturing. Moreover, the correlation between move-
ments in unit wage costs and prices has been increasing. As 
F<gure VII •h�" during the period 1958-1967 <he coheM�on J 
efficient between changes in unit wage costs and pri, es l (r�) wJ
about . 3 , and in the period 1967 to 1976 it was abou .5. I And 
during the second period, the "mountain" stretched o t l1otg th'. 
regression line, indicating a tendency for very high inJre ses II. 
unit labor costs to be associated with very high inc eaJesl in 
prices. l It should be noted that this diagram was o taine� by 
simply counting the number of industries in each cell ald ravin 
the computer plot the heights of the mountain accordlngJy. Hojl
ever, it also should be noted that the smoothness of l thl p�ane 
around the ��tai� waa enh�ced by c�puter interpf laliob th• 
preserved all the original data points. Such diagrams Jave an 
iEport�t advantage over the f�iliar acatter diagr•t•; [ naj,ely, 
they provide a better picture of the changes that have oee' 
occurring. 
pare 
is 
usll 
2 
To return to the main discussion, it shoul� be 
that the businessman is becoming more intent on bala cilg 
budget over the course of the entire business cycle. clr· 
enough, as of the time that Calvin Coolidge was pres"delt, 
fi� were far le•• conce�ed with bal�cing their b dgtt• 
the course of the entire business cycle than they weire du' 
bushie!ss 
period after World War II -- at which time prices mowed 
accordance with general business conditions and lessl in 
ove� 
.ng t 
e ij! 
s j 
costs. 
During the earlier period the industries ih wai the 
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association between unit labor costs and prices was the highest
were the high productivity industries. However, this does not 
necessarily indicate there was little rivalry in these industries.
Rivalry seems to have taken the form of improvements in quality 
rather than reductions in price. As far as the semiconductor and 
computer industries are concerned, we certainly know this to be 
true. On the other hand, the most startling improvements in the 
correlation during the latter period occurred with respect to the
medium and, especially, the low performance groups. It is almost
as if people in the latter industries thought they could enjoy 
the same degree of stability by adopting the same pricing practices!
Contrary to what is generally believed, changes in unit 
labor costs are in major degree associated with changes in pro-
ductivity and not with changes in wage rates. As Figure VIII shows,
in both periods the correlation coefficient was about .8. On the 
other hand, there is no significant correlation between changes 
in wages and changes in unit labor costs. To be sure, for many 
years economists were in general agreement that increasing wage 
rates, as the economy neared full employment, was one of the main
causes of inflation. In fact, for years the relationship between 
the rate of inflation and the degree of unemployment (i.e., the 
Phillips curve) was regarded by macroeconomists as a sacred truth.
However, what generates large increases in prices during periods 
of prosperity is not so much abrupt increases in wage rates as it
is declines in productivity. 
This is not to say, of course, that increases in wage
i 
rates have no impact on inflation. In fact, wage raies ra e be� 
come quite as irresponsive to downturns as prices. hus i bott 
<he 1971 and 1973-1974 do�<urn•, inorea'"a in wage jac1 eganl 
to abate only after recovery was underway. On the 01h•1 li nd, · 
is equally clear that placing the major blame for in laoion on 
the labor unions certainly would involve a gross disborjioh of 
the facts. But I hasten to add that neither can thelblJmelfor 
rhe inflariun be arrribured ru rhe greed uf rhe b�i e,,,.. 
Between the two periods the rate profits rose was soil ewhatlless 
than the rate wages increased in the second period a cdmpared 
with the first. Whatever else may be said about thelatJe�bt of
firms to set prices in a way to balance their budget ojerl the 
cycle, it certainly is not a sign of greed. Indeed, l tht f .ndam 
I reason the stock market was more exuberant during th 1920 may, 
well be that then good times and high profits were mprelhighly 
correlated. 
What may be said about movements in wages s fh1· the1 
are highly responsive to the degree of rivalry in an indus ry. I
Particularly in industries with a high degree of riv lr� t ere 
a large variance in profit rates. This in turn mean tiatl if 
labor unions try to push for too rapid increases in f agL It hey 
will risk pushing the less profitable firms out of b siless. O
the other hand, in industries with a lower degree of rijalry a 
lower degree of constraint on wage increases is to b ejpected. 
Is this a reasonable hypothesis? If it is, then we lhojld l fin& 
little or no correlation between wage and productividy ihcJease1 
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If the higher productivity industries are, generally speaking, 
the most rivalrous, then we should observe a higher degree of 
wage constraint in those industries than in the lower productiv-
ity industries. As Figure IX shows, the correlation is close to 
zero. However, it also may be observed that in the later period 
there was a tendency for wages to rise more rapidly in the higher 
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productivity industries -- another indication that rivalry in those 
industries was declining. 
On the other hand, it is also not surprising that when 
inflation began in the late 1960s wages and prices in the medium 
and low productivity industries rose at about twice the rate they 
did in the high productivity industries, because those industries 
provided a lower degree of constraint upon wages. 
While some economists tend to blame the unions for 
everything bad, and others, like Galbraith, blame the business 
leadership, the truth is that a lack of rivalry and highly demanding 
unions go hand in hand. 
To sum up this discussion: Leaving the land and the 
gold speculators out of account, inflation is a zero-sum game. The 
slowdown in productivity gains certainly contributed to inflation. 
But the longer-term slowdown is only a relatively small part of the 
story. The main part of the story concerns the cyclical behavior 
of productivity gains: the tendency for the rate of productivity 
gain to slow down before the rate of output slows down, and as 
this occurs costs and prices are pushed upward. In such a crazy 
world the rate of inflation can be expected to reach its maximum 
in poor times and its minimum in good times! 
V. PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE 
It would be nice, of course, if those firm 
prices most during a recession were suitably punishe 
that raised prices least, suitably rewarded. If tha 
cur, the feedback effect might help to mitigate both 
of the next wave of inflation and the subsequent eco 
Unfortunately, however, there is no such close assoc 
low price growth and high growth in output. To be s 
tion gathers more and more momentum, customers are f 
their buying. For example, it is well-known how con 
to very rapidly increasing meat prices. Nevertheles 
the manufacturing industries are concerned, the evid 
high degree of negative demand response to price inc 
relatively weak. As Figure X shows, there is no sig 
correlation between low growth rates and prices and 
rates in output. To be sure, the upper left hand si 
diagram does indicate that in the recent period ver 
rates in prices have been associated with negative 
in output. However, just how much feedback effect 
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in mitigating future inflation will be very difficullt t\:> jjudge 
until we have had another serious downturn. 
It should be apparent from this discussio 
as the future is concerned policymakers do, indeed, 
serious dilemma. Monetary restraint is the principa 
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for dealing with inflation. But the more that monetary restraint 
slows growth in output, the more that productivity will be damaged, 
and the more rapidly prices will increase! To be successful in 
preventing inflation, monetary policy would have to keep us in a 
permanent state of recession -- because only by doing so could 
it insure an adequate supply of negative feedback was more or less 
continuously available. Unfortunately, however, those who would 
have to pay the price of such a stability policy are mainly the 
youth and the minority groups; in these two groups the incidence 
of unemployment is the greatest. 
On the other hand, as some Republican senators have been 
urging, perhaps the action to take is to cut taxes. No doubt, in 
the short-run this would stimulate output and productivity; and 
in doing so a tax cut would help keep prices down. But what about 
the impact on the longer-run stability of the country? To the 
extent that such a policy was successful in the short-run, it would 
justify raising prices during the slack times, because whenever 
there was a shortage of buying power the government would stand 
ready to make up the difference. 
Indeed, to my way of thinking the fundamental reason 
prices have become less and less responsive to downturns is that 
the businessman has come to regard the maintenance of his stability 
more a public responsibility than a private responsibility. To 
be sure, the response to a recession is to find ways to reduce 
costs; because only by improving productivity can the rate of 
price increase be brought under control. Nevertheless, there is 
a real danger that if the government goes much 
guaranteeing stability it will weaken even this 
the consequence that in depressed times the rate 
be even greater. 
What, then, should be 
Frankly speaking, I am not very optimistic about 
of convincing economists and politicians that 
back are intimately related. Before this is 
doubtedly will have to experience more serious 
have witnessed to date. 
himself as a temporary visitor from 
!edged that this is a fantastically 
